American escalation, 1961-1968

H1 History - syllabus 8838, 2027

What this lesson teaches

  • I can judge which factors shaped the Second and Third Indochina Wars.

    Syllabus 8838, Theme III, Learning Outcomes. evaluate the factors that shaped the development of Cold War conflicts in Southeast Asia

Make a guess

In 1963 there were about 16,000 US military advisers in South Vietnam. What do you think happened by 1968?

  1. Over half a million US troops were fighting a ground war.
  2. The advisers had gone home, because the South was winning.
  3. Congress had declared war on North Vietnam.
Show the answer

Over half a million US troops were fighting a ground war.

The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson broad powers, and from 1965 bombing and ground troops grew year by year.

Credibility, the domino theory and fear of a communist victory led the USA from advisers to a large ground war.

Eisenhower sent aid and advisers. Kennedy increased the number of US military advisers to about 16,000 by 1963. American leaders believed in the domino theory: if South Vietnam fell, communism would spread across Southeast Asia.

In August 1964, after reported clashes with North Vietnamese boats, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It gave President Johnson broad authority to use force in Southeast Asia without a declaration of war.

In March 1965, Johnson began Operation Rolling Thunder, a sustained bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and sent the first combat troops. By 1968 more than half a million American troops were in Vietnam.

Johnson's reasons combined credibility, containment and domestic politics. In April 1965 he said the USA had a promise to keep and that abandoning South Vietnam would shake allies' confidence in American commitments. He also feared the political cost of being blamed for "losing" Vietnam, as Truman had been blamed for China.

Advisers
About 16,000 by 1963.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
August 1964.
Rolling Thunder
Bombing of the North from March 1965.
Peak deployment
More than half a million US troops by 1968.

Real examples to use

Pleiku, 7 February 1965

An attack on a US base led Johnson to order reprisal raids, which grew into the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign.

Marines at Da Nang, 8 March 1965

The first US ground combat units landed, moving the USA from advising to fighting.

Ia Drang, November 1965

The first major battle between US and North Vietnamese troops showed the North would accept heavy losses.

Worked example: Linking credibility to escalation

Why did Johnson escalate in 1965?

  1. Weakness: the Saigon government seemed close to collapse after 1963.
  2. Credibility: Johnson argued allies from Berlin to Thailand relied on US promises.
  3. Containment: the domino theory linked Vietnam to all Southeast Asia.
  4. Limits: he kept the war limited to avoid war with China or the USSR.

Watch out for this

The USA declared war on North Vietnam in 1964.

Congress never declared war. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution gave Johnson authority to use force.

Check your understanding

What did the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution do?

  1. It gave the president broad authority to use force in Southeast Asia.
  2. It ordered US advisers home by 1965.
  3. It declared war on North Vietnam and its ally China.
Show the answer

It gave the president broad authority to use force in Southeast Asia.

Right. It became the legal basis for escalation.

Sources and context

Background reading for this chapter.

  • Johnson explains why Americans are in Vietnam

    Paraphrase of President Lyndon Johnson's address at Johns Hopkins University, 7 April 1965.

  • McNamara recommends more troops

    Paraphrase of a memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Johnson, 20 July 1965.

  • The Geneva final declaration

    Paraphrase of paragraph 7 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference on Indochina, 20 July 1954, as cabled by the US delegation.

  • Nixon appeals to the silent majority

    Paraphrase of President Richard Nixon's televised address to the nation on the war in Vietnam, 3 November 1969.

  • Eisenhower explains the stakes, 1954

    Extract from President Dwight Eisenhower's news conference of 7 April 1954, answering a question on the strategic importance of Indochina, a month before the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. A US government record in the public domain; text from the American Presidency Project.

  • a Defense official ranks American aims, March 1965

    Extract from "Action for South Vietnam", a paper prepared by John McNaughton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Washington, 10 March 1965, two days after the first US Marines landed at Da Nang. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume II, document 193. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the Secretary of State on American commitments, July 1965

    Extract from a paper by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Washington, 1 July 1965, written for the President's meeting on whether to send large numbers of combat troops. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume III, document 39. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the Under Secretary of State dissents, July 1965

    Extract from "A Compromise Solution for South Viet-Nam", a paper by Under Secretary of State George Ball for the same meeting, Washington, undated (circulated 1 July 1965). The President's security adviser predicted that Johnson would "listen hard to George Ball and then reject his proposal". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume III, document 40. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the Secretary of Defense explains the strategy, November 1965

    Extract from a draft memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to President Johnson, "Courses of Action in Vietnam", Washington, 3 November 1965. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, volume III, document 189. A US government document in the public domain.

The Wise Otter

Getting your study space ready