How economic crises helped the Nazis

G3 Full History - syllabus K330, 2027

What this lesson teaches

  • I can explain how authoritarian regimes rose in Germany and Japan, and judge how they changed politics, society and the economy.

    Syllabus K330, Rise of Authoritarian Regimes, Learning Outcomes. Examine the rise of authoritarian regimes and evaluate their impact on the political, social and economic context of countries.

Make a guess

Germany suffered two economic crises: hyperinflation in 1923 and the Depression from 1929. Which do you think did more to win the Nazis votes?

  1. Both equally, because prices rose very fast in each crisis and savings vanished.
  2. Hyperinflation, because savings became worthless and the Nazis took power that year.
  3. The Depression, because millions lost their jobs and gave up on the main parties.
Show the answer

The Depression, because millions lost their jobs and gave up on the main parties.

Mass unemployment after 1929 made Nazi promises of jobs and strong leadership attractive. Their vote grew sharply from 1930.

Money became worthless in 1923, and mass unemployment after 1929 turned many voters towards the Nazis.

Keep two crises apart. The first was hyperinflation in 1923, when prices rose extremely fast. German money lost so much value that savings and fixed incomes, such as pensions that did not rise with prices, became almost worthless. But people with debts could pay them off cheaply. So the same crisis hit people differently.

Hyperinflation grew out of wartime money problems. It got much worse when French and Belgian troops occupied the Ruhr, an industrial region. The German government backed passive resistance: workers refused to cooperate with the occupiers. The government kept paying them while production stopped, and it printed more money to cover its spending. A new currency and financial reforms ended hyperinflation in late 1923, and recovery followed.

The second crisis was the Great Depression, from 1929. Germany's recovery had depended partly on foreign loans, especially from the USA. When lending and world trade fell, businesses were hit hard. Firms cut production or closed, and millions lost their jobs. This was a crisis of falling output and unemployment, not a return of the 1923 price rises.

People who lost work, or feared losing it, lost faith in the main parties. Nazi promises of jobs, strong leadership and national recovery became attractive to some voters. Others turned to the Communists or stayed with democratic parties. Hardship gave the Nazis a bigger audience; their campaigning turned that chance into votes.

1923
Hyperinflation: money loses almost all value.
1929
Great Depression brings mass unemployment.
Nazi votes
2.6% in 1928; largest party by July 1932.

Real examples to use

Hyperinflation, November 1923

Before the war one US dollar bought about 4.2 marks. By 20 November 1923 it bought about 4.2 trillion marks.

Dawes Plan, 1924

American-led experts cut Germany's yearly reparation payments and arranged a loan of 800 million marks, so recovery depended on American money.

Unemployment, early 1933

About 6 million Germans were registered as unemployed when Hitler became chancellor.

Worked example: From hardship to votes

The Nazis won 2.6% of the vote in 1928. By July 1932, in the Depression, they were the largest party.

  1. A worker loses a job and doubts the government can help.
  2. The Nazis promise recovery under Hitler.
  3. Some voters switch. This shows a link, not that every jobless person voted Nazi.

Watch out for this

The Great Depression began in 1923 when money became worthless.

1923 was hyperinflation. The Depression began in 1929 and brought mass unemployment.

Check your understanding

Which crisis helped the Nazis most in elections?

  1. The Depression after 1929, which caused mass unemployment.
  2. Hyperinflation, which began in 1923 and lasted until the 1930s.
  3. The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1929, which closed factories.
Show the answer

The Depression after 1929, which caused mass unemployment.

Yes. Nazi votes rose sharply from 2.6% in 1928.

Sources and context

Background reading for this chapter.

  • Hitler asks for trust

    Paraphrase of Hitler's radio appeal on behalf of the new Reich government, 1 February 1933, reproduced by GHDI.

  • USHMM, Enabling Act; law translated from Reichsgesetzblatt I, 1933, p141

    Paraphrase of Articles 1-3 of the Enabling Act, promulgated 24 March 1933; text translated from the official law gazette by USHMM.

  • Wels opposes the Act

    Paraphrase of SPD leader Otto Wels' Reichstag speech, 23 March 1933, as reproduced in the German Bundestag historical exhibition, p2.

  • workers' mixed responses

    Paraphrase of a Central Germany report commissioned by the exiled Social Democratic leadership (Sopade), September 1938; published in GHDI.

  • Hitler's confidential memorandum on autarky, August 1936, GHDI

    Paraphrase of the concluding instructions in Hitler's confidential memorandum on autarky, August 1936, published in GHDI.

  • a Nazi election poster, July 1932

    An original poster drawn for these notes in the style of Nazi Party posters for the Reichstag election of 31 July 1932. It is not a copy of a real poster, but its promises match what Nazi posters of that campaign offered unemployed voters.

  • the Enabling Act, March 1933

    Extract from the "Law to remove the distress of people and State" (the Enabling Act), 24 March 1933, signed by President Hindenburg and Chancellor Hitler. English translation of document 2001-PS from Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, volume IV, published by the US Office of Chief Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality (1946); text from the Avalon Project.

  • the American ambassador reports, 30 June 1934

    Extract from a telegram from William Dodd, US Ambassador in Germany, to the Secretary of State, Berlin, 30 June 1934, 5 p.m., sent on the day the purge began. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, volume II, document 194. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the ambassador looks again, 2 July 1934

    Extract from a telegram from Ambassador Dodd to the Secretary of State, Berlin, 2 July 1934, two days later. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, volume II, document 197. A US government document in the public domain.

  • the German Foreign Minister explains, July 1934

    Extract from a telegram from Ambassador Dodd to the Secretary of State, Berlin, 6 July 1934, reporting what the German Foreign Minister, Konstantin von Neurath, told him. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1934, volume II, document 199. A US government document in the public domain.

The Wise Otter

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